Abstract. Functional explanation, for long the mainstay of psychology's autonomy, has recently come under attack. It is sometimes argued that higher-level generalizations are causally impotent, and do not really explain anything. Presumably only the reduction of higher-level patterns to underlying causal physical properties, and the specifying of lower-level, local causal mechanisms, provides genuine explanations. Two lines of argument are critically discussed: causal exclusion and multiple realization. These bear upon the credibility of functional explanation, and upon the presumed explanatory superiority of causal mechanisms over functional higher-level generalizations. It is argued that the causal exclusion argument conflates metaphysics with explanation, and that, rather than pointing towards reductionism, multiple realization indicates the indispensability of higher (functional) generalizations, alongside lower (causal) explanations; the choice for higher or lower level depends on context and explanatory interest. The notion of screening-off suggests a criterion for the legitimacy of higher-level characterizations. A brief example from the history of genetics is discussed to illustrate these ideas. This leads to a plea for pluralism in explanation.
Introduction: Causal and Functional Explanation
This paper examines the issue of causal and functional explanation in complex contexts. Two such contexts relevant for psychology are genetics and cognitive science. Surprisingly perhaps, explanatory styles in cognitive science and (behavioural) genetics show some remarkable similarities: both wrestle with the difficulty of decomposing complex causal systems; both invoke representations or codes as explanations of behaviour and phenotypic traits, respectively; and in both, such functional or representational explanation sits uncomfortably with causal explanation. Causes and codes, brute force and functionally or teleologically characterized processes seem mutually exclusive as explanations, and in a causally closed physical world, the first category, cause, seems to have a claim to ontological and explanatory primacy, leaving no room for higher-level functional explanations. Thus, what is at stake is the legitimacy of functional characterization of complex but ultimately physical systems. Although biological examples will loom large in this paper, the case of psychological explanation is remarkably similar (Keijzer, 2001; Wheeler & Clark, 1999) .
In psychology, the debate on so-called 'folk psychology' is about the validity of intentional explanations in psychology, that is, about explanations that cite mental representations (beliefs and desires, knowledge, thoughts, information and goals) as the causes of behaviour. The question here is whether mental representations are more than epiphenomena, and whether they can figure as causes in scientific laws in psychology (Fodor, 1990) . Functionalism (Sterelny, 1991) attempts to legitimize common-sense intentional explanations by construing these as functions, implemented in the neural structures of the brain, in the same way as a computer program is implemented in silicon chips. The discussion on folk psychology is in essence about the status of daily ('folk') discourse that assumes that what humans do is caused, predicted and explained by what they want and know, and about the claim that cognitive science is in the business of extending this discourse by finding the intentional laws that underwrite it. Critics of this approach argue that the intentional idiom lacks scientific integrity and will have to be replaced by neurophysiology (Churchland, 1981) .
Functional explanation often takes the form of decomposition of complex systems. This consists in describing a system in terms of what it does, and then explaining its behaviour in terms of what its (functionally defined) components do (Bechtel, 1986; Bechtel & Richardson, 1993; Cummins, 1983) . This method is often mentioned by theorists in cognitive science and philosophy of mind as an argument for the autonomy of functional psychology vis-à-vis causal-physical explanations (Fodor, 1981b) . Likewise, in the philosophy of biology, many authors (Amundson & Lauder, 1994; Enc & Adams, 1992; Rosenberg, 1985) argue that functional language is indispensable (although some admit this with reluctance-namely as a result of the exceedingly complex nature of biology; Rosenberg, 2001) , or because the biomedical sciences are not yet mature enough (Schaffner, 1993) . For example, Rosenberg (1985, pp. 255-256) points out that in biochemistry the actions of macromolecules are described as intentional and functional: macro-molecules transcribe and translate, read and write, build and repair, recognize, discriminate, make errors, and so on-much like 'homuncular' explanations in psychology (Dennett, 1987) . Thus, in both psychology and biology, functional and representational explanations seemed to have a legitimate place.
Recently, however, the rationale for attributing functions to complex physical systems as a scientific strategy, and the use of intentional language to describe and explain their behaviour, has come under fire, in both psychology and biology. In psychology, whether beliefs and desires are springs of behaviour, or just hopelessly obsolete notions, to be replaced by neuroscience (Churchland, 1981) , is a hotly debated problem. In biology, the reduction of the functional description of genes as coding for phenotypic traits to causal biochemical chains has recently found strong advocates (Rosenberg, 1997 (Rosenberg, , 2001 Waters, 1994b) .
It will be argued in this paper, against such reductionist views, that the phenomena of context dependence and screening-off (see below) make functional explanation indispensable in both fields, and that both the story of cognition and the story of genetics are incomplete when told in lower-level causal-mechanical terms. First, the idea of functional explanation and decomposition will be discussed, and recent arguments, mostly due to Kim (1998) , against the ontological and explanatory integrity of functional terminology will be critically reviewed. Second, the recent debate on multiple realizability, for long the mainstay of arguments for an autonomous psychology, will be followed towards its somewhat novel, pluralistic conclusion. Next, a criterion is introduced for sifting the chaff from the wheat regarding levels, so-called 'screening-off'. Finally, some developments in genetics are briefly sketched to illustrate the irreplaceability of a functional level of description. This leads to a plea for multiple ways of carving up reality.
Functions and Causes in Cognitive Science

Functional Decomposition as Explanatory Strategy in Cognitive Science
The orthodox view in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind holds that cognitive systems have the essential property of being sensitive to information, not just to causal-mechanical influences (Block, 1995; Pylyshyn, 1984) . Activities that are characteristic of cognitive systems, like perception, memory, judgement and thinking, are apparently best understood in terms of the system's constructing and manipulating mental representations and using these as internal models to guide rational action. In cognitive science, homuncular or functional analysis is a method to account, in a naturalistic way, for cognitive representational capacity, by decomposing a cognitive system into smaller, more 'stupid' subsystems (Cummins, 1980 (Cummins, , 1989 Dennett, 1987; Fodor, 1968; Lycan, 1987) . A rational homunculus, originally described in intentional terms (beliefs, desires, goals, knowledge) , is eventually understood as composed of an army of simpler homunculi. For example, the lowly desk calculator that realizes the laws of arithmetic may be composed of processors for adding, subtracting, adding to a store, and so on. The question 'how does it work?' is answered by specifying how the subroutines or processors work, and then how the components of each of these work, and so on. Eventually, functional decomposition ends at some primitive non-cognitive process, such as the input-output functions of silicon chips or neurons (Cummins, 1983) . Crucial is that each of the subsystems has interpretable or symbolic inputs and outputs, that is, it transforms input representations into output representations, not just physical impulses for the next subsystem. Thus, each of the homunculi is still described in at least minimal cognitive or functional terms (e.g. adding numbers), not as physical processes (Block, 1995) .
The promise of functional analysis is that it captures representational capacities in a naturalistic way. The homuncular decomposition strategy is thus directly related to the distinction between functional and causal explanation: as Van Gelder (1995) puts it, representation, computation and homuncularity are mutually interdependent features. In the desk calculator, algorithmic operations performed by the machine allow symbolic interpretations of physical states. Some function exists that maps semantics onto syntax (Block, 1995) , such that symbolic regularities are isomorphic to semantic values (the digits that appear on the calculator display nicely follow the laws of arithmetic), and can be interpreted as output of a semantic, not just causal-electronic, process. Briefly, the semantic machine is mirrored in the syntactic machine (Haugeland, 1991) .
The homuncular decomposition strategy is widely seen as the orthodox story of cognitive explanation in cognitive science (Cummins, 1989; Fodor, 1981b; Sterelny, 1991) . It supports a distinction between functions and causes, since it involves at least two levels: the mechanical and the semantic/ functional, where the latter supposedly captures essential properties of mind and cognition. However, whereas causal explanation is presumably unproblematic, since it is underwritten by the successes of hard science, it is less obvious what the ontological and explanatory status of function and representation is, and whether decomposition always works for complex interactive systems. These two problems will be the subject of the next two sections, respectively.
Function: Interpretation or Explanation?
Cummins ' (1989) proposal for homuncular decomposition, which he calls interpretational semantics, holds that under interpretation the lower, mechanical level can be seen as cognition, and symbol structures can be seen as representation. Interpretational semantics shows how to discover rational thought in mechanical processes, 'revealing mind where there was only mechanism' (Cummins, 1989, p. 125) . Thus, the relation between the semantic and the syntactic engine is a matter of observer-relative interpretation. Representation, intentionality and meaning are no more than a byproduct of successful interpretation, in which mechanical transactions are seen as cognitive processes and representations. Cummins is interested in successful explanation, not in ontology, and accepts that (in cognitive science at least) explanations depend on interests and points of view. He explicitly refrains from giving a solution to the philosophical question how the semantic engine attaches to a syntactic engine, or what the causal role of meaning is. This is a kind of gambit, since it abandons any claim to ontological reality and causal powers of the mental. As we will see below, this position is vulnerable to charges of epiphenomenalism and causalexplanatory irrelevance, and it can only be vindicated by its empirical success. Simon (1969) introduced the idea of decomposability and neardecomposability in the explanation of complex systems. He points out that the only way evolution can create viable complex systems is to assemble them out of a hierarchy of relatively stable components. In nearly decomposable systems, the interactions between subsystems are negligible relative to the interactions within subsystems. Bechtel and Richardson (1993) provide a wealth of examples of successful decomposition in cognitive and neurosciences. However, as they point out, the condition of neardecomposability is not always met: there are examples of systems with interactive components, and these may have emergent properties that cannot be simply decomposed in localized subfunctions. In particular, coupled systems may produce emergent properties that cannot be analysed in homuncular fashion (Bechtel & Richardson, 1993; Clark, 1997) . The componential strategy may fail for complex, mutually constraining networks.
Problems with the Functional Decomposition Strategy in Complex Systems
Recently, dynamic systems theory (Clark & Torribio, 1994; Eliasmith, 1996 Eliasmith, , 1997 Van Gelder, 1995 ) went a step further and challenged the plausibility of the homuncular view as an account of cognition; it urges its replacement by models of continuous coupled dynamic systems, which do not assume distinct subsystems. Van Gelder (1995 suggests as a more adequate metaphor for cognition, the Watt governor (a regulator mechanism controlling the speed of a steam engine), where continuous reciprocal causation rather than transmission of information between cognitive agents produces intelligent behaviour. Bechtel (1998) counters that even highly interactive systems may in principle be analysed (interpreted) in homuncular, representational and intentional components. In the case of the Watt governor, as a metaphor for highly integrated, non-modular systems, he distinguishes two kinds of explanations. The first is mechanical explanation, which amounts to decomposition. Even in the Watt governor case, it may be illuminating and LOOREN DE JONG: CAUSAL AND FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATIONS 295 explanatorily interesting to distinguish homuncular components. For example, a mechanical part of the machine may be considered as representing a quantity like speed; it can then be said to carry information that other parts can use (which Van Gelder doesn't really deny). The other is the nomological explanation, which posits general laws governing a class of such dynamic systems; as in physics, these laws take the form of differential equations. The point for the present discussion of Bechtel's debate with Van Gelder is that giving homuncular interpretations is a more tricky business than many theorists in cognition have realized. Too often in cognitive science the legitimacy of intentional idiom has been presented as somehow obvious, and the problematic has been located in reconciling it with a materialistic worldview (a subject we will turn to below). Van Gelder shows the potential pitfalls of attributing representations to systemic components that do not require a representational explanation. That of course leaves us with the tricky question: when, if ever, do complex systems require functional explanations?
The Problem: The Causal/Explanatory Irrelevance of Mind and Function
The dynamicist criticism of the orthodoxy in cognitive explanation thus raises the spectre of the epiphenomenality of function: what does it mean to carry information, over and above being a part of the (physical) causal structure of the system? Remember that the decomposition strategy requires semantic, representational interpretation of the components, not just a description in terms of cogs and wheels.
Moreover, it has been demonstrated that not all complex systems require semantic explanations, and sometimes, even for sophisticated behaviour, representational description turns out to be unwarranted (Brooks, 1995) . For example, the female cricket navigates towards the source of her prospective mate's song using a simple mechanism exploiting an amplitude difference between left and right ear (described in Wheeler & Clark, 1999, pp. 109-110) . The explanation of her behaviour doesn't require, or warrant, any talk about the cricket's representations, beliefs or goals; her mechanism is not different from the workings of, say, the gearbox of a car (Wheeler & Clark, 1999) .
So, the question is: what is the explanatory leverage representational talk gives us, over and above causal and mechanical explanation? Are only causal and mechanical explanations real, and are functional explanations just heuristic?
Similar objections have been raised against functional explanations in biology. In a classic paper, Gould and Lewontin (1984) ridiculed the facile attribution of function to any odd trait, and this 'panglossianism' is widely acknowledged as a liability of the adaptationist programme (Mayr, 1988) .
Moreover, although most authors recognize that functional descriptions are somehow indispensable (Rosenberg, 2001) , it is often argued that the story at a functional level in biology (say, the story of how a butterfly develops mimicry) is just a description of the explanandum, and that only the filling in of the biochemical details of the causal chain underlying these phenomena gives a real, sufficient and complete, explanation (Rosenberg, 2001) .
Functional explanation as sketched above is a methodological principle, however, it goes hand in glove with philosophical ideas. The methodological problems with functional analysis merge into more fundamental philosophical arguments for the conclusion that functional explanations lack substance. Two lines of argument stand out: epiphenomenalism (functional explanations are no more than heuristically useful but causally inert labels) and multiple realization (the causal heterogeneity of multiple realizable properties suggests that they cannot figure in explanations).
The Causal/Explanatory Power of Functional States
The Orthodox View on Mental/Functional/Intentional Causes
The orthodox view in the philosophy of mind is that psychology is in the business of providing intentional laws that generalize over internal representational states (e.g. a belief that it is raining causes umbrella-carrying behaviour). Note that folk psychology is thus transfigured into the stuff cognitive science is made of: mental content, beliefs and desires, are taken literally as causes and now figure in causal laws. Mental properties are functional properties and as such are characterized by their causal role (Fodor, 1981b) . Fodor (1990) argues that mental content can be said to be causally efficacious if it figures in a psychological law. But, one may ask, how can a mental cause coexist with a physical cause of the same behaviour? Two causes of the same behaviour, tugging at the same muscles, is not an attractive picture. The standard solution, developed by Davidson (1981) , is that a (token) mental cause is a (token) physical cause. There are no mental causes apart from physical (neural) causes: mental events derive their causal powers from the physical processes that realize them.
There are many ways in which mental processes can be realized by physical processes; for this reason there is no general and lawful relation between types of physical events and types of mental events. Mental events are ultimately physical events, but mental laws are irreducible to physical laws. Thus, the orthodox view amounts to a kind of non-reductive materialism. On the one hand, it allows for a view of the universe that is nothing but matter in motion. On the other hand, mental and functional explanations are in principle autonomous and irreducible (Fodor, 1981a) .
This view on the mind-body relation was (supposedly) further supported by the notion of supervenience, which combines a relatively independent role for higher-level properties with their dependence on physical properties. Very briefly, and ignoring a number of subtleties, supervenience holds that mental states cannot change without changes in physical (neurophysiological) states, so they depend on these physical states. This notion excludes dualist horrors like disembodied minds, but at the same time it asserts that no reductive relations between mental and neural events are likely to be found. However, Kim, who initially advocated supervenience (Kim, 1993) , has started to criticize non-reductive materialism as an unstable position (Kim, 1998 (Kim, , 1999 .
Problems with the Orthodox View: Causal Exclusion
Kim (1998) now pictures supervenience as more of a statement of the problem than a solution: it points to covariation of mental and physical properties, but doesn't really explain this relation-it requires rather than gives an explanation. Another, even deeper problem with supervenience is that a materialist must assume that physical causes are the only ones to do real work. Let P be a physical property that causes another physical property P*, and let M be a mental event supervening on P, and M* a mental event supervening on P*. Both M and M* depend on physical processes, which do all the causal work: M cannot be said to cause M*, nor can M* be said to cause P*. When a physical stimulus (P) causes physical behaviour (P*), there is no causal role for M or M*. (Kim's favourite example is pain and firing of nerve cells: stabbing causes firing of nerve cells, and the firing of nerve cells makes us cringe, not the mental process of feeling pain.) Thus, there is no causal role left for mental processes. Supervenience gives no positive grounds for accepting anything like mental causation, and that undermines the plausibility of the non-reductiveness of non-reductive materialism. Kim's (1998) causal exclusion principle says that an event cannot have both a physical and a mental cause of the same event. If the mental did some causing of its own, distinct from ordinary physical causation, then behaviour would have more than its share of causes: causal overdetermination. Of course, since no one wants to sacrifice the naturalistic principle of material causation, the conclusion must be that the mental is causally impotent. Introducing mental causes and intentional laws will lead to a metaphysical mess, where anything goes as far as explanations are concerned (in Kim's words: a 'free lunch', where any old cause can be invented).
In a closed material universe, independent mental processes cannot be accommodated. This conclusion directly extends to functional explanation: causal impotence threatens functional explanations in the same way as it does mental causation. In both cases, real causes are physical, the material world is causally closed, and there is no room left for a causal role for functional states. This line of reasoning seems to lead inevitably to a THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 13 (3) 298 deflationary view of mind and function: if these have any explanatory role at all, this seems to be entirely heuristic or conceptual, rather than genuinely explanatory. One might conclude that, since mental and functional properties depend for their causal properties on the physical processes that realize them, they are themselves causally inert, and in a sense epiphenomenal (Kim, 1998) . Kim's (1998 Kim's ( , 1999 most recent proposal for the relation between higherlevel mental properties and physical properties is realizationism: we get the best picture of mind-body relations by finding out how functional and mental properties are physically realized. Mental properties are functional higher-order properties that are ontologically nothing over and above physical properties. Explaining them involves finding the physical mechanism that fills the functional role. This is analogous to, for example, finding the chemical substances that account for the functional property of 'dormitivity' of a sleeping pill: the causal role of dormitivity is nothing more than the causal actions of its (chemical) realizers. Likewise, mental properties represent no causes over and above the neurophysiological processes by which they are realized. Functionalizing is a three-step process (Kim, 1999) . First, one has to specify the causal nomic relations that make up the explanandum: mental processes are primed for reduction by describing them in terms of relations, as a second-order property defined by their causal role (e.g. pain causes a wish to withdraw from the source of the pain). The next step is to find the realizers, that is, to show how physical properties fit the causal specification (e.g. pain is firing of nerve cells). Third, a theory is sought that explains how these realize the function to be explained (e.g. firing of these nerve cells causes muscular contractions).
1
Functionalization and Reduction
Kim claims that mental causation is best understood along the lines of realizationism. As mentioned, causal exclusion holds that you can't have two causes of the same behaviour. Kim's new view on reductionism is now that mental properties are realized as physical properties: physical properties generate psychological regularities and underlie psychological explanations (Kim, 1998, p. 96) . Mental processes have no causal powers but those inherited from physical processes: shrinking from pain is not caused by pain as such, pain is a cause only in virtue of physical properties that realize it. So functionalization amounts to (is necessary and sufficient for) reduction.
Emergence, Levels and Downward Causation
We can see now where Kim thinks non-reductive materialism went wrong. The intuition behind non-reductive materialism was that somehow at higher levels new, full-blooded functional and mental properties emerge from the LOOREN DE JONG: CAUSAL AND FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATIONS 299 neural machinery, and then exert downward influence on the neural processes (Kim, 1999; Sperry, 1969) . However, although Kim recognizes that new causal powers and ontologically real properties may emerge at higher levels of organization, mental properties are not among them. For example, the colour or the weight of a table is a new property of the macro-physical level, not present at the level of atoms and molecules. In contrast, mental and functional properties are no such ontologically new higher-level properties, and have no emergent causal powers. Rather, mental properties are second-order properties of the physical processes from which they inherit their causal powers, as the dormitivity of a sleeping pill is a second-order property of its first-order chemical effects.
Thus, we should distinguish between higher-order and higher-level properties. Emergent causation is an inter-level relation. Function, on the other hand, is an intra-level relation of a second-order property to first-order physical properties, and consists in having a physical realizer for the causal role of the second-order property. The mistake of non-reductive materialism was to conflate the order relation with the level relation. In the same way, supervenience is an intra-level relation: the instantiation of a physical property is sufficient for the mental property to occur. That solves the causal exclusion problem. There are no additional causal powers for supervenient mental properties: supervenient causation is nothing over and above its subvenient causation.
In a sense Kim eliminates mental properties: having a second-order functional property is no more than having a physical property that fits the functional role description. The causal powers of mental properties are the causal powers of their realizers. There is only one causal process, described in different languages (Kim, 1999) . Mental causation and functional explanation are saved only by deflation, that is, by revealing them as part of the physical. And its fate may even be worse: it is also possible (Kim, 1998, pp. 108-110) that some (or all) mental concepts do not refer to natural kinds, and that finding their realizers may reveal that mental processes are on closer consideration a heterogeneous collection. In that case concepts referring to them are better abandoned, or perhaps dissolved into neuroscience.
To sum up, Kim has provided some additional philosophical reasons to disavow functional explanations. Unlike the doubts, mentioned in the preceding section, about all-too-easy attribution of function in cognitive science, his arguments rest on metaphysics, more precisely the presumed necessity to avoid causal overdetermination. His alternative is that functions be considered as the roles that physical processes play, and that real explanation is only possible by finding their physical realizers-which amounts to a de facto reductionism with respect to functions. Functional explanations are deflated as more or less preliminary definitions of the explananda, not as an explanans in themselves.
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Explanation versus Causation: Getting away from Metaphysics
The main line of defence against Kim's reductionism with respect to functional and mental explanations in this paper will be that his attachment to metaphysics leads to a misconception about scientific explanatory practice. To start with a subject close to Kim's metaphysical concerns, let us see how mental causation can be construed in a more pluralistic way. Jackson and Petitt (1990) argue that processes can be causally relevant in explaining behaviour, even if not causally effective. Citing representations, beliefs and desires as causes of behaviour may be more relevant for psychological explanations than the physics of causation. This is not necessarily contrary to Kim's functionalizing strategy (in fact, Jackson [1996] comes quite close to Kim's position). However, reductionists think that such laws are 'loose' explanations, using a 'cheap', more or less epiphenomenalistic kind of function (Churchland, 1981) .
Recall that the implication of the causal exclusion problem was that the explanatory role of higher-order properties is only apparent, since behaviour is produced by physical mechanisms. However, the issue of causal exclusion seems to exercise remarkably few theorists outside philosophy of mind. In biology, functional and causal explanations coexist. An alternative construal of causation suggests why. It can be argued that causes are relative to explanatory interests and levels of description, and that causes are cited against a background of simplifications, idealizations and pragmatic decisions. As a more empirical and less a priori metaphysical construal we may adopt the following definition: causes are events that increase the probability of another event (Hardcastle, 1998) . This definition allows a multitude of causes at many different levels of describing the world (Hardcastle, 1998) . The dependence of causes on the level of description is consistent with the intuition that they also depend on explanatory interests: as J.S. Mill well understood back in 1856:
. . . each condition of the phenomenon may be spoken of if it were the entire cause . . . . that particular condition is usually styled the cause whose share in the matter is most conspicuous, or whose requisiteness to the production of the effect we happen to be insisting on at the moment. (Book III, Ch. 5, § 3, p. 363) When explaining a flood, we may cite the bad condition of the dikes, or the force of the storm, or the greenhouse effect, or a negligent government as its cause. As Hardcastle (1998) puts it, causes are everywhere; there are many causal ways to capture the same event, and causal chains exist at different levels of organization. When postulating a property makes sense at some level of description, it is potentially a cause (in the weak sense advocated by Hardcastle [1998] causality is inherited from underlying realizers, it does not mean it is unreal. What counts as a cause depends on explanatory concerns and on the type of effect. Even if a mental cause and a physical cause produce the same event (e.g. we may say that existential angst leads to depression, and that serotonin depletion leads to depression), they may still be different from an explanatory view. The causal efficacy of supervenient processes may arise out of or consist in their subvenient physical properties, but inherited causality is causality nevertheless (as Marras [2000] puts it, an inherited fortune is real money too). Being inherited does not make a cause epiphenomenal.
Thus, the problem of causal exclusion disappears, at least as a problem for explanation; there may be many different levels of description for objects in the world, and thus many levels of causation. Functions, goals and mental representations may be among them.
The Pragmatist View of Causation: Agency and Manipulation
Yet another approach to stripping the notion of causation of its metaphysical ballast is by relating it, in a pragmatist way, to human agency. The 'manipulative' account of causation (von Wright, 1993; Woodward, 2000) holds that a cause is a point of intervention by, for example, experimental manipulations. Von Wright (1993) proposes to analyse causal explanations in science in terms of intervention. One application of this idea is that evaluating counterfactuals is a matter of finding out what happens when interference is omitted; this amounts to verifying that observed regularities are real laws (causal nomological connections), not just accidental generalizations. Thus, causal laws have a 'test procedure characteristic'. Causality is not ontologically dependent on human actions (causation obviously also occurs without a human agent), but it is epistemically dependent on them (the only way to find out about causes is through experiment). (Causation is also conceptually or logically dependent on action, since the concept of action involves changes in the world.) So the manipulative view on causation sees an essential connection between human agency and causation, while avoiding subjectivism and anthropomorphism.
Woodward (2000) makes an even stronger connection with experiments: he proposes to define causes as what would happen if certain experiments (natural or human) were conducted. This idea of causation goes hand in glove with an analysis of experiments as intervention in some causal chain, so that mechanisms other than the natural ones become visible for measurement. The meaning of a causal claim is that it is a claim about the outcome of hypothetical (not necessarily actual or practically possible) experiments, and causal claims that cannot be phrased in terms of (perhaps hypothetical) experiments will probably just lack meaning. Research is more than observation, it is also manipulation. This leads Woodward to propose 'instrumental realism', in which causal relations (though not necessarily entities) are THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 13(3) 302 interpreted realistically. The activity view of causality thus does not entail subjectivism: causes are not a projection of our mental categories onto the world. Rather, the difference between mere correlations and full-blown causes involving counterfactual claims about the outcome of experimental interventions implies realism. As we will see below, the manipulative view of causation nicely fits a real example in biology (Gannett, 1999) .
With the issue of causal exclusion safely contained in the arcane realm of metaphysics, we now have some room for a pluralistic view of explanation, and within it (in principle) room for functional explanation. That leaves the question whether and when, in view of the pitfalls of pan-adaptationism and panglossianism mentioned above, functional/mental explanation is appropriate. Of course, that is essentially an empirical question, which no a priori philosophy can legislate: whether, in the example given above, it is legitimate to attribute representations to a cricket depends on the availability of an adequate non-representational mechanical explanation. The same applies to the prospects for folk psychology to survive the progress of neuroscience. However, we can formulate a guideline: when two models of the same event, say a mentalist and a physical model, are available, the decision can be made by asking whether the lower (physical) adds anything to the higher (mental) level of explanation. This is the basic intuition behind the notion of screening-off (McClamrock, 1995, Ch. 3), to be discussed below. However, there is a line of argument in favour of functional explanation that first has to be dealt with: multiple realization supposedly saves functional cognitive theories from reduction to neurophysiological theories. In order to clear the path for a plausible appraisal of the respective roles of functional and causal explanations, the rigid anti-reductionism behind the multiple realization argument has to be defused.
Multiple Realization and Pluralism in Explanation
Multiple Realization
The major line of defence for functional explanation is traditionally multiple realizability, which holds that the same function can be realized in many different physical devices (a hackneyed example: a mousetrap can be realized in different structures that have nothing physical in common). Apart from an ontological thesis about the way functions exist, multiple realizability also contains a methodological lesson: functional generalizations are (in a significant number of psychologically relevant cases) more wideranging and more powerful than physical generalizations (if you doubt this, try to give a molecular description of all possible mousetraps).
In the philosophy of mind, multiple realizability has, since Putnam's (1961) classic paper, provided a forceful argument for the autonomy of LOOREN DE JONG: CAUSAL AND FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATIONS 303 cognitive science vis-à-vis neuroscience, and for the bona fide explanatory role of higher-level properties such as intentional and functional descriptions (Fodor, 1981b (Fodor, , 1997 . If it is true that mental processes have a many-to-one relation with their realizers, attempts at reduction will get mired in a heterogeneous disjunction of physical states, and thereby lose explanatory power. For example, a mental state like hunger has presumably the same causal role in octopuses and humans, but the corresponding neural states may be quite different. Fodor and Putnam built their defence of autonomous psychological laws on the sheer impossibility of identifying mental events with neural events: psychological properties cannot be reduced to their realizers, hence psychology cannot be replaced by neuroscience, and will remain master of its own proprietary domain of functional explanation.
Somewhat surprisingly, it took some time for philosophers to realize that the opposite conclusion from multiple realizibility is also possible. The fact that the prospects for identifying mental and physical states, establishing complete reductions, are dim may be turned into an argument for abandoning rather than retaining the functional level. For example, a mental representation may either be realized in a neural firing pattern in humans, or in some silicon-based process in computers, or in something else in extraterrestrials. The notion of representation is thus related to an open disjunction of realizers: it is ontologically heterogeneous, hence it can be no natural kind; it is unfit as a projectible predicate in bona fide nomic generalizations and cannot figure in respectable laws of nature (Kim, 1992) . In general, reductionists argue that functional kinds (such as mousetraps, things that can be used as a door-stop, representations, or states of hunger) are no part of scientific taxonomy and are not covered by serious scientific laws. When in a generous mood, they may concede that perhaps such kinds are in a sense analytically true, as a matter of definition (real laws of nature of course are contingent), and that as such they may be valuable as heuristics because they order the domain of investigation, and facilitate real scientific work (Shapiro, 2000) .
The reductionist view on multiple realization is that a heterogeneous disjunction of two (or more) nomological generalizations is itself not a projectible predicate and cannot figure in a nomological generalization (Kim, 1992) . For psychology, this means that its laws and explanations will be fragmented when neuroscientific explanations become available (Kim, 1992, p. 26) , and that it can be no more than a collection of disjunct domainspecific laws.
In accordance with the functionalizing strategy, Kim urges us to look for local, presumably species-specific, reductions. Psychological states like representations or pain may have neurally different realizations in different organisms, and reducing them may produce a disjunctive series of local reductive identifications between mental and neural events. In this case, THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 13 (3) 304 losing generalizations over the functional causes of the behaviour of different species may even be good riddance.
However, the reductionist once more seems to conflate ontology and explanation: being multiply based is not necessarily the same as being nomologically disjunctive and heterogeneous (Fodor, 1997) . That is, not every multiply realized property necessarily yields a lot of messy disjunct generalizations. The catch in the reductionists' reasoning is that they consider only physical (i.e. physically homogeneous) kinds as real and genuinely causal and explanatorily powerful. Thus they a priori rule out higher-level, non-physical concepts from explanations. Whether such nonphysical, multiply realized explanatory generalizations exist is, as Fodor (1997) rightly remarks, a question for which you have to do the science. Whereas Kim tries to rule out disjunctive multiply realized psychological kinds on metaphysical grounds, Fodor rightly leaves that to empirical work.
If cognitive psychologists find lawful generalizations over mental representation, thoughts, perceptions or memories, even if these have unruly and disjoint mappings onto physical laws, so be it. And in biology, an example of such a multiply realized and yet explanatorily useful concept might be fitness; this figures in theories of natural selection, and can be realized in all sorts of physically different phenotypic traits (Sober, 1993, pp. 73-77) . The empirical facts suggest that somehow micro-interactions produce macrostabilities (Fodor, 1997) , and somehow concepts like fitness or mental representation allow generalizations over a wealth of structural features. 'Doing the science' suggests that ontological dependency on a heterogeneous realization base does not necessarily mean explanatory heterogeneity, or unwieldy disjunctive generalizations.
'Room for Lumpers and Splitters'
So multiple realization is in itself an argument neither pro nor contra reduction of functional explanations. However, there is another lesson here. No more than Kim has convincingly demonstrated that only local physical reductions are worth having, have champions of autonomy like Fodor demonstrated that focusing on higher-level properties is always the superior strategy. Depending on explanatory interest, we may prefer either local micro-reductions in depth, or we may prefer autonomous higher-level concepts that generalize over many multiply realized instances and ignore implementation details. McCauley and Bechtel (2001) point out that the 'grain size' of the current explanatory question determines whether we want to generalize over or distinguish between, for example, octopusian and human hunger. As Sober (1999) put it: in science there is room for lumpers and splitters. Recall that Putnam's (1981) and Fodor's (1981b) argument against reduction was that by going to lower-level implementation details we LOOREN DE JONG: CAUSAL AND FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATIONS 305 lose explanatory power. Fodor's (1981b) original argument for autonomy of the functional level of explanation was that in the case where a disjunction of lower-level laws explains a higher-level law, there is a many-to-one mapping. This makes it impossible to identify a higher-level property with a lower-level property for each singular instance: two individuals with the same higher-level property (e.g. fitness) may not share any lower-level (e.g. anatomical) property. Putnam (1981) argues that explanation should abstract from micro-physical details and provide the relevant laws at the higher level of detail. Sober's (1999) counter-argument is that, while it may be true that lower-level details explain little, that doesn't mean that they explain nothing. Multiple realization cannot dictate our current preference for breadth or depth of explanation in a particular case. We may sometimes be interested in 'deep' local reductions, while on other occasions a complete story on the implementation details may be more than we want to hear. Unification or disunification may be reasons for preferring a global generalization or local reduction, respectively, but multiple realization in itself offers no ground pro or con local reductions.
The conclusion is that we should distinguish between, on the one hand, ontological dependence, where we might concede that local reductions are possible, and, on the other, the pragmatic decision whether we want lowerlevel detail or not. Bechtel and Mundale (1999) demonstrate with a wealth of detail that multiple realization is no barrier to successful identification of cognitive functions with brain structures. Neuro-anatomists since Brodmann have appealed to psychological functions in individuating brain areas. The comparative approach assumes that functions are not entirely differently realized in different species, and that homologies can be used to extrapolate from primitive organisms to humans. More recently, the use of brainimaging techniques in combination with psychological tasks assumes that at least some mental functions can be located in circumscribed areas of the brain. Finally, Bechtel and Mundale show that the anatomy of the visual cortex has been an indispensable guide in decomposing functions of the visual system such as movement detection and object identification. In these cases, contrary to the original multiple realization argument, functional processing systems are identified using evidence from brain anatomy.
So, in real brain research, multiple realization plays no decisive methodological role, either for autonomy or for local reductionism. Whether a more or less global or local identification between function and structure is feasible depends on what one takes as similarities and differences between the relata, and that in turn depends on the level of generalization and on explanatory interests. Interestingly, this conclusion also applies to the reductionists' preferred level of explanation, physics. Batterman (2000) shows that physics generalizes over multiply realized parameters of physical systems (a simple example: the period of a pendulum), so that the philosophical injunction to find local reductions is simply at odds with scientific THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 13(3) 306 practices in real physics. Also, the reasons why these systems obey the same laws can be specified in terms of physical laws and principles. That means that multiple realization does not support complete autonomy: at least in the case of physics that Batterman describes, the systems have lower-level properties in common that support a higher-level generalization. The lowerlevel realization base is not as irrelevant as the orthodox view assumed and the implementation details are not completely arbitrary (see also Block, 1997) . Presumably, hunger in octopuses and humans may well have something in common at the level of their realizers. Contrary to Putnam's famous phrase, we might not, for all that matters, all have been made from Swiss cheese.
To sum up: the locality or globality of generalizations depends on explanatory interest, and multiple realization can only weakly constrain such pragmatic and context-dependent taxonomizing. There is plenty of room for different explanatory pragmatic choices, for lumping or splitting. Following the thread of the multiple realization debate, we have, somewhat surprisingly, found that we have no reason to limit the choices to the two options that have dominated the debate, local reductionism and complete autonomy, and we have arrived at the same pluralistic and pragmatic conclusion as we saw in the mental causation debate.
Screening-off and Higher-level Properties
Screening-off
Multiple realization is only one of two phenomena often supposed to prevent direct explanation of higher-level properties by a lower level. The other is context dependence (McClamrock, 1995) : the same lower-level property may be involved in the realization of several higher-level properties, and the context determines what part of the lower-level activity is a realization of which higher-level function (McClamrock, 1995, p. 25) . For example, the same electronic component may serve different functions in different systems, and we need a systemic view to see how a component works. In developmental genetics, location and timing determine whether a gene (a base-pair sequence) is switched on or not. That is, whether a base-pair sequence functions as a gene (a transcription sequence) or not is contextdependent. Thus, lower-level, chemically type-identical structures may in different contexts differ in higher-level genetic properties. In the same way, identical physiological or computational states may, depending on the environment, subserve different psychological processes and thus have different causal powers (Looren de Jong, 1997; McClamrock, 1995) .
So context dependence seems to underwrite the existence of different levels of explanation, and of causal powers at different levels. It warrants LOOREN DE JONG: CAUSAL AND FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATIONS 307 talk about higher-level causality and a causal role for functional characteristics. The notion of screening-off offers a somewhat more precise criterion for what may count as a level in explanation.
What Constitutes a Level?
Informally, a property is said to screen off another property if adding the latter does not improve prediction or explanation (more precisely, A screens off B from C if adding A makes B irrelevant for C [but not vice versa]). In Brandon's (1990, pp. 83-84) proposal, proximate causes can be said to screen off distal causes: when we know all the transactions between an organism and its near environment, no additional knowledge about, for example, evolutionary history improves predictions for its survival. In this case, the lower-level local causes are sufficient for explanatory purposes. As least as interesting is the case where context-dependent higher-level properties screen off lower-level implementations (McClamrock, 1995, pp. 47-48) . One such case may obtain when distal goals may be reached via several routes, or when functional states are realized in different ways: proximal details may vary, while distal factors are identical (for an account of distal and proximal factors in perception and the views of Heider and Gibson, see Keijzer, 2001, pp. 62-65, and Looren de Jong, 1995) . When the predictions and descriptions of the latter are not improved by local details, generalizations over distal goals as causes of behaviour are legitimate. In psychology, functional and intentional states typically extend into the world, and mind-world relations at the right level of generalization involve multiple paths to the object of behaviour. That means that distal causes, usually of a teleological nature, constitute a level of analysis and causation.
To sum up: the notions of context dependency and screening-off secure a role for explanations at multiple levels. The twin principles of multiple realization (lower-level properties may vary when higher-level properties remain fixed) and context dependency (higher-level properties may be different in systems with some [but not all] identical lower-level properties) suggest a certain freedom to choose what counts as a level. When a higherlevel cause screens off the lower-level causal details and gives a complete explanation and accurate predictions, we may consider that level of description as legitimate and explanatorily interesting. For example, in evolutionary biology, functional explanation may be a legitimate strategy, and in psychology, intentional and representational properties can be cited as real causes whenever they figure in successful explanations.
Functions and Causes in Genetic Explanations
A thumbnail sketch of the concept of gene as explanation may serve to illustrate three points made above: (1) a functional perspective is indis-THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 13(3) 308 pensable; (2) a unitary higher-level concept may fragment in a number of local generalizations, giving rise to multiple, context-dependent explanations; and (3) a construal of causation as 'manipulative' and pragmatic allows theorists to steer clear of the metaphysical preoccupations that bothered some philosophers, and this view of causation also fits genetic explanation.
The Functional Perspective and Screening-off in Genetic Explanation
The problem of levels of explanations, among them functional explanation, can be seen in genetic explanations (Wheeler & Clark 1999) . Much more is required than biochemistry, and functional characterizations are employed alongside mechanical explanations. The central dogma of genetics (Crick and Watson) is that phenotypic characteristics are coded for by (represented in) genes. (It is by now widely accepted that genes are not like a blueprint containing a complete specification of the resulting phenotype; Sterelny & Kitcher, 1988 .) Wheeler and Clark (1999) explored the analogy between genes-as-codes and representations in cognitive science (see also Keijzer, 2001) . They formulate three criteria for genuine representations (p. 128), as distinct from mere co-determination. Representations are states with the functional role to bear content, and this role is characterized, first, by arbitrariness: the genetic code carries content in a way that could have been different with respect to its material realization (e.g. genes could have been coded in silicon as long as the relation between triplets and amino acids has the same mapping). Second, there is a 'consumer' of this information, a process that uses it (in the case of genes, the processes of transcription [DNA to mRNA] and translation [RNA to amino acids] ). That is, genes can be said to have the function of preserving and transferring information, of coding and decoding, not just of exerting mechanical brute force. Third, (genic) representations should have some systematic combinatorial structure.
The functional role of coding seems to be the characteristic that sets (genic) representations most clearly apart from mere causal codetermination. We may say that genes code for or specify development and therefore figure prominently in explanations, even though they are just one factor in a complex web of causes. Genes have some explanatory priority, although they have no causal priority (Schaffner, 1998) . Paraphrasing Cummins (1989, p. 125) , we now see biological function where there was only biochemical mechanism. In this way, functions are non-causal explanations (Enc & Adams, 1992) , which are indispensable for understanding why the causal mechanisms are there in the first place. The biochemical processes can be interpreted, Cummins-wise, as carriers of information, and thus they are revealed as having been selected for the transmission of survival-LOOREN DE JONG: CAUSAL AND FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATIONS 309 enhancing traits. So it is legitimate to interpret DNA sequences as carriers of information, coding for phenotypic traits, and thus explaining at a functional level the laws of inheritance. We can say that these genes cause phenotypes, but only in the weak and innocuous sense of enhancing the probability of phenotypes (Hardcastle, 1998) , not in the ontologically strict sense of causes behind Kim's causal exclusion principle.
Looking at DNA as selected information carrier puts biochemical processes in a wider perspective, and allows new generalizations and predictions (Enc & Adams, 1992) . Using functional and evolutionary explanations in this way illustrates the notion of screening-off. Relatively complete explanations can be given at the level of Mendelian inheritance, and specifying the biochemical mechanisms does not necessarily improve explanations and predictions (see also Sterelny and Kitcher, 1988) .
Pluralism in Genetic Explanation
One way to illustrate the difference between a pluralist view on explanation and the more traditional option of reduction is by a (very) brief excursion into the recent history of genetic explanations. In the debate on reducibility of the classical (roughly 'functional') Mendelian concept of gene to molecular genetics, one position, defended by, among others, Kitcher (1994) , is that the Mendelian gene figures in explanatory schemes that do not map onto explanations in molecular genetics, although it can provide some solutions to problems in the latter, and vice versa. The other view is that Mendelian genetics will be entirely dissolved into the new molecular view (Waters, 1994a (Waters, , 1994b . In some textbooks on molecular genetics, the term 'transcription sequence' is proposed as replacement for 'gene'.
A look at the recent history of the concept of gene as explanation suggests a more complicated picture (Keller, 2000) . Initially, the gene was seen as the determinant of development and the fundamental explanatory unit that accounts for intergenerational stability (i.e. it explains why kids look like their parents). This classical gene is considered a distinct, intrinsically stable, self-reproducing element. The aspect of stability that explains why the properties of life are maintained across generations is particularly interesting, since it answers the important question why life does not go down the drain of increasing entropy, as thermodynamics would predict, but rather keeps and increases order (complexity) against all odds.
Crick and Watson's discovery of DNA seemed to have revealed the chemical structure that nicely filled the bill: DNA is both stable, accounting for constancy, and self-replicating, accounting for inheritance. The central dogma of genetics became: one gene, one protein (DNA is transcribed into mRNA, and mRNA is translated into protein). It seemed that DNA could explain the secret of life, inheritance and the preservation of information and order on the basis of its chemical structure. As such, it seemed a prize THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 13(3) 310 specimen of reduction: biochemistry presumably explains, reduces and replaces the Mendelian gene as unit of inheritance (Waters, 1994b) . Keller (2000) lists three sets of problems for the central dogma: editing in transcription; regulation of protein synthesis; and context dependence of protein function. These phenomena introduce noise, slack and contextual effects that belie the simple 'one gene, one protein' dogma. If DNA is subject to editing, proofreading and repair, it cannot vouchsafe heritability and stability on its own. Post-transcription regulation adds several layers of contextual influences onto the DNA-to-protein pathway. Genetic programmes must be seen as highly distributed and dynamic, not as static structured codes. This leads to the paradoxical result that stability of phenotypic outcome is realized with varying structural chemical components and along different developmental pathways. Developmental stability cannot be accounted for by, let alone reduced to, the stability of biochemical structures (see Griffiths & Gray, 1994) . Keller (2000) concludes that the concept of gene has lost its usefulness as explanation and we should look for new concepts. Perhaps a more precise diagnosis would be that the overarching notion of gene has fragmented into a number of local and contextual notions. One may interpret the brief sketch above as a retreat from an all-embracing explanation of phenotypic development into a number of local and delimited domains. For example, GodfreySmith (2000) has concluded that the theoretical role of genetic coding is in fact restricted to cell level, and the overarching idea of genes as codes, with teleological and semantic properties (the gene as blueprint, coding for or representing or programming phenotypic traits), does not stand up to scrutiny; only the ordering of amino acids in protein synthesis is explained by genetic coding. Further generalizations, for example deciding which properties are inherited and which acquired, are beyond the explanatory scope of genetic explanations.
Causes in Genetics
Keller (2000) argues that what remains of the notion of a gene is an operational definition in terms of experimental practices: what is manipulated, recombined, knocked out, cloned, and so on, in genetic laboratories. In her view, it is no big problem that the concept is used in such a loose and imprecise way, since the precision lies in experimental practices. This fits quite nicely with the 'manipulative' view of cause mentioned above. Genes are causes in the pragmatic sense of being manipulable; they are experimental handles, partial and short-term points of influence for experimental interventions. Experimental manipulations provide an anchor for genetic vocabulary. Gannett (1999) shows that, since all genetic effects are multiply determined, no gene is a cause of a trait in an absolute sense; only in a context, against a causal background, and relative to an environment and a population can genes be said to cause a phenotype. Therefore the only reason for giving genes a privileged role in explanation is that they are more tractable and can be manipulated more easily than the other factors. The grounds for calling a trait genetic, then, are better understood from a pragmatic view of cause: causing means manipulation to achieve certain results, relative to purposes, in combination with other necessary conditions (Gannett, 1999) . Genetic manipulations (e.g. recombinant techniques, knock-out) bring about, that is, cause in this sense, phenotypic traits.
It will be clear by now how misguided are metaphysical strictures on causal explanations like the causal exclusion principle. Multiplicity of explanation as illustrated in the above thumbnail sketch of genetics shows that genetic explanation was never about complete and sufficient causation, but is one among selective perspectives at intersecting levels of explanation.
To sum up: analysis of explanatory practices suggests that the causality of genes is context-dependent, pragmatic and limited in scope (to the context of the cell, to manipulation in experiments, etc.) and should not be stretched beyond that. The big concept of a gene according to the central dogma has disintegrated into a loosely connected herd of context-specific concepts; the notion of gene that seemed to answer all the questions about the nature of life and heritability has retreated into a number of niches, defined by local experimental practices (Keller, 2000) . Principles like causal exclusion, multiple realization and autonomy of functional explanations are irrelevant for real explanations. Pluralism seems a better picture, and among multiple levels of explanation the functional level is indispensable. This illustrates that the picture of 'lumping and splitting' and the pragmatic and pluralist view of causes are more adequate than the metaphysical concerns dominating some corners of the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mind.
Conclusion
Returning to the question of functional and causal explanation in cognition as well as in similar domains in biology, we see that functional, higher-level explanation can be illuminating in interpreting complex systems. A functional point of view interprets what a lower-level mechanism does in the context of an organism and its environment. This shows how a transcription sequence of base-pairs functions as a code for a phenotypic trait, and how a silicon chip works as memory, or a neural pattern as mental representation. Brain processes can be seen as knowledge, perceptions, memories, beliefs and desires. Causal chains of molecular reactions can be interpreted in functional idiom as executing some task, like reading or copying DNA, or coding for selected traits. The metaphysical objections against functional explanation, based upon causal and explanatory overdetermination, dissolve once it is realized that explanation and causation are context-relative:
THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 13(3) 312 explanation answers 'why' questions against a background of assumptions and unasked questions; relevant factors are singled out from a lot of other possible but currently uninteresting processes. Furthermore, the agency view of causation supports a pragmatic and pluralist view of causal explanation that seems especially appropriate for genetics. The metaphysics of causality should be distinguished from explanation.
The famous (or notorious) principle of multiple realization, on close consideration, supports neither complete autonomy of the higher level, nor all-out local reductionism, but it points towards explanatory pluralism, where sometimes broad generalizations ignoring implementation details, sometimes narrow and detailed local reductions, are appropriate.
Functional broad generalizations can provide an extra ingredient over and above mere causal dispositions (Enc & Adams, 1992) : functions set up a new type of explanandum, and suggest new taxonomies in terms of goals. Function ascription suggests newer and broader generalizations and patterns than mere physical characteristics, and reveals behavioural patterns not visible in structural features. Referring to mental representations makes possible interesting but non-causal explanations and predictions. Therefore, not all causal dispositions are always relevant, and not all interesting explanations are causal (Enc & Adams, 1992; Gasper, 1992) . In the liberal, pragmatic and context-dependent view of causal explanation, functional constructs like representations and genetic codes may be said to explain behaviour or phenotypes, respectively. This suggests that several levels of explanation, causal and functional, may coexist in the explanation of complex systems, such as genetics and cognitive behaviour. Note 1. It should be noted that the background assumption of these arguments is physicalism: roughly the idea that the ontology of macro-physics implies a causally closed picture of the world. Radder (2001) has argued that the 'ontology of physics' has no definite meaning-physics has no single ontology-and that physicalism is an empty position. Within the scope of this paper, we will grant the notion of causal closure, but not the reductionist inference that only causal explanations are valid.
